Deserving doing essay in responsibility theory

It suggests that any given action, and even a person's character, is the result of various forces outside that person's control. It may not be reasonable, then, to hold that person solely morally responsible. For instance, a person driving drunk may make it home without incident, and yet this action of drunk driving might seem more morally objectionable if someone happens to jaywalk along his path getting hit by the car. This argument can be traced back to David Hume. If physical indeterminism is true, then those events that are not determined are scientifically described as probabilistic or random.

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It is therefore argued that it is doubtful that one can praise or blame someone for performing an action generated randomly by his nervous system without there being any non-physical agency responsible for the observed probabilistic outcome. Hard determinists not to be confused with Fatalists often use liberty in practical moral considerations, rather than a notion of a free will. Indeed, faced with the possibility that determinism requires a completely different moral system, some proponents say "So much the worse for free will! What has this boy to do with it?

He was not his own father; he was not his own mother; he was not his own grandparents. All of this was handed to him. He did not surround himself with governesses and wealth.

Doing & Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility by Joel Feinberg

He did not make himself. And yet he is to be compelled to pay. Paul the Apostle , in his Epistle to the Romans addresses the question of moral responsibility as follows: "Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, researchers in the emerging field of neuroethics , argue, on the basis of such cases, that our current notion of moral responsibility is founded on libertarian and dualist intuitions. For example, damage to the frontal lobe reduces the ability to weigh uncertain risks and make prudent decisions, and therefore leads to an increased likelihood that someone will commit a violent crime.

Greene and Cohen also argue that the legal system does not require this libertarian interpretation. Rather, they suggest that only retributive notions of justice , in which the goal of the legal system is to punish people for misdeeds, require the libertarian intuition. Many forms of ethically realistic and consequentialist approaches to justice, which are aimed at promoting future welfare rather than retribution, can survive even a hard determinist interpretation of free will.

Accordingly, the legal system and notions of justice can thus be maintained even in the face of emerging neuroscientific evidence undermining libertarian intuitions of free will. Neuroscientist David Eagleman maintains similar ideas. Eagleman says that the legal justice system ought to become more forward looking. He says it is wrong to ask questions of narrow culpability, rather than focusing on what is important: what needs to change in a criminal's behavior and brain.

Eagleman is not saying that no one is responsible for their crimes, but rather that the "sentencing phase" should correspond with modern neuroscientific evidence.


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To Eagleman, it is damaging to entertain the illusion that a person can make a single decision that is somehow, suddenly, independent of their physiology and history. He describes what scientists have learned from brain damaged patients, and offers the case of a school teacher who exhibited escalating pedophilic tendencies on two occasions—each time as results of growing tumors. Derk Pereboom defends a skeptical position about free will he calls hard incompatibilism.

In his view, we cannot have free will if our actions are causally determined by factors beyond our control, or if our actions are indeterministic events—if they happen by chance. Pereboom conceives of free will as the control in action required for moral responsibility in the sense involving deserved blame and praise, punishment and reward. Without libertarian agent causation, Pereboom thinks the free will required for moral responsibility in the desert-involving sense is not in the offing. For instance, causally determined agents who act badly might justifiably be blamed with the aim of forming faulty character, reconciling impaired relationships, and protecting others from harm they are apt to cause.

Pereboom proposes that a viable criminal jurisprudence is compatible with the denial of deserved blame and punishment. His view rules out retributivist justifications for punishment, but it allows for incapacitation of dangerous criminals on the analogy with quarantine of carriers of dangerous diseases.

Isolation of carriers of the Ebola virus can be justified on the ground of the right to defend against threat, a justification that does not reference desert. Pereboom contends that the analogy holds for incapacitation of dangerous criminals. He also argues that the less serious the threat, the more moderate the justifiable method of incapacitation; for certain crimes only monitoring may be needed. In addition, just as we should do what we can, within reasonable bounds, to cure the carriers of the Ebola virus we quarantine, so we should aim to rehabilitate and reintegrate the criminals we incapacitate.

Pereboom also proposes that given hard incompatibilism, punishment justified as general deterrence may be legitimate when the penalties don't involve undermining an agent's capacity to live a meaningful, flourishing life, since justifying such moderate penalties need not invoke desert. Compatibilists contend that even if determinism were true, it would still be possible for us to have free will.

The Hindu text The Bhagavad Gita offers one very early compatibilist account. Facing the prospect of going to battle against kinsmen to whom he has bonds, Arjuna despairs.

Introduction

Krishna attempts to assuage Arjuna's anxieties. He argues that forces of nature come together to produce actions, and it is only vanity that causes us to regard ourselves as the agent in charge of these actions. However, Krishna adds this caveat: " Krishna's admonition is intended to get Arjuna to perform his duty i. Obeying the ego leads to bondage; obeying the soul brings liberation. In the Western tradition, Baruch Spinoza echoes the Bhagavad Gita ' s point about agents and natural forces, writing "men think themselves free because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant [of those causes].

Of what use is restraint?


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  8. Daniel Dennett asks why anyone would care about whether someone had the property of responsibility and speculates that the idea of moral responsibility may be "a purely metaphysical hankering". Bruce Waller has argued, in Against Moral Responsibility MIT Press , that moral responsibility "belongs with the ghosts and gods and that it cannot survive in a naturalistic environment devoid of miracles". Mauro suggests that a sense of personal responsibility does not operate or evolve universally among humankind.

    He argues that it was absent in the successful civilization of the Iroquois. In recent years, research in experimental philosophy has explored whether people's untutored intuitions about determinism and moral responsibility are compatibilist or incompatibilist. For instance, when people are presented with abstract cases that ask if a person could be morally responsible for an immoral act when they could not have done otherwise, people tend to say no, or give incompatibilist answers.


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    When presented with a specific immoral act that a specific person committed, people tend to say that that person is morally responsible for their actions, even if they were determined that is, people also give compatibilist answers. The neuroscience of free will investigates various experiments that might shed light on free will. When people attribute moral responsibility, they usually attribute it to individual moral agents.

    Responsibility Ascriptions in Technology Development and Engineering: Three Perspectives

    One of the attributes defined for psychopathy is "failure to accept responsibility for own actions". The emergence of automation, robotics and related technologies prompted the question, 'Can an artificial system be morally responsible? The questions arguably adjoin with but are distinct from machine ethics , which is concerned with the moral behavior of artificial systems. Whether an artificial system's behavior qualifies it to be morally responsible has been a key focus of debate. Batya Friedman and Peter Kahn Jr posited that intentionality is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, and that computer systems as conceivable in in material and structure could not have intentionality.

    Arthur Kuflik asserted that humans must bear the ultimate moral responsibility for a computer's decisions, as it is humans who design the computers and write their programs. He further proposed that humans can never relinquish oversight of computers. Frances Grodzinsky et al.

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    They posited that if the machine had a fixed state transition table, then it could not be morally responsible. If the machine could modify its table, then the machine's designer still retained some moral responsibility. Patrick Hew argued that for an artificial system to be morally responsible, its rules for behaviour and the mechanisms for supplying those rules must not be supplied entirely by external humans.

    He further argued that such systems are a substantial departure from technologies and theory as extant in An artificial system based on those technologies will carry zero responsibility for its behaviour. Moral responsibility is apportioned to the humans that created and programmed the system.

    What Is Justice?: Crash Course Philosophy #40

    A more extensive review of arguments may be found in. Colin Allen et al. Andreas Matthias described a 'responsibility gap' where to hold humans responsible for a machine would be an injustice, but to hold the machine responsible would challenge 'traditional' ways of ascription. He proposed three cases where the machine's behaviour ought to be attributed to the machine and not its designers or operators. First, he argued that modern machines are inherently unpredictable to some degree , but perform tasks that need to be performed yet cannot be handled by simpler means.

    Second, that there are increasing 'layers of obscurity' between manufacturers and system, as hand coded programs are replaced with more sophisticated means. Third, in systems that have rules of operation that can be changed during the operation of the machine. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. For other types of responsibility, see Responsibility. Please create a new list with a new name; move some items to a new or existing list; or delete some items.

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